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It is easy to use many variations of the metaphor to describe Chomsky’s warning to 
intellectuals. Imperial Chinese mandarins progressed up a strictly demarcated chain 
of seniority and non-revisionist service before being within the proximity of the 
emperor’s court and perhaps even the emperor; Simone de Beauvoir wrote a famous 
novel about the mandarins of post-war France – the brilliant men and women who 
flitted between the writing of books and attending the salons of ministers, who 
constantly betrayed one another, betrayed fidelity, truth and even France.2 High 
priests stood before thrones, as the Archbishop of Canterbury still does, and Lords 
Spiritual, Bishops, retain membership of the Lords. In the UK, these people speak 
for orthodoxies, even if sometimes liberal and far-sighted orthodoxies. Even an 
orthodoxy may be far-sighted. In Chomsky’s rendition, however, all are merely 
janitorial, sanitorial, lavatorial. Chomsky presumes a single locus of power – not a 
diffusion among those he criticises – and that it is necessarily malign or given to 
malignancy in the conduct of international relations. He was writing at the time of 
the Vietnam war, when much rewriting of history accompanied a pronounced and 
sustained effort, through several US administrations, to deny others and support 
one’s own.
Fifty years after Chomsky’s critique, indictment and warning, is the implication 
of what he said sufficient for vexatiously difficult times? What he said of course 
chimes with the longetivity of the vision of academic existence as cloistered, 
uncontaminated, seeking after truth in the Karl Jaspers rendition of wissenschaft, 
upon which all modern claims to academic freedom and autonomy sit – the 
Jaspers wissenschaft acting itself as a mediator and interpreter of a millennium of 
university independence and, more often than not, aloofness, otherworldliness.3 
But the formulation has always been dyadic, binary, and simply oppositional: the 
world and the institutions of truth, and the world ‘out there’ of untruth. In the 
Chomsky rendition it assumes these characteristics even more starkly than before. 
The difference between Chomsky and Jaspers is in the Chomskian sallying forth 
from the bastions of objective and uninterested truth to attack, verbally at least – 
and to support others who attack more than verbally – the citadels of power and its 
interests.
However, it is not simply a case of choosing or not choosing to speak, or how to 
speak, or when to speak what kind of truth to power, or one aspect of power. There 
are too many generalisations in the Chomsky critique, alongside his stark binaries. 
In any case, ‘power’ often appropriates those it chooses will speak on its behalf. Nazi 
Noam Chomsky famously coined the term, the ‘new Mandarins’, meaning 
those who had abandoned the speaking of critical truth to power and, 
instead, mediated power’s sense of self-serving truth to the wider world.1 
It was a warning against being drawn into positions of priesthood, of 
being the janitorial sanitation of power and policy.
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Germany chose to be spoken for by Nietzsche, and chose to be inspired by Wagner 
and Goethe. They, at least, had no say in it.4 It seconded thinkers like Heidegger to 
its programme, not to endorse his ontological project, but to channel it – just as it 
channelled Nietzsche’s will to power – to its overwhelming sense of self-directed 
destiny.5 The post-war programme of Horkheimer and Adorno, and its sense of 
critical theory – to render philosophy too dense as well as too critical ever again to 
be simply used, to be used in a simplified form, by tyranny has made much critical 
work the product and consumption of an intellectual ghetto.6 It is not used by power 
because power has no interest in something so marginally self-contained. It does not 
break out. It does not speak truth to power – although it imagines it does – it speaks, 
as in this readership, mostly to itself. 
As it is, others whom Chomsky might accuse as 
being the mandarins and high priests of power speak 
philosophy – quite well, as it turns out in the case 
of Fukuyama and his use of Hegel and Nietzsche;7 
and quite badly in the case of Kagan and his use of 
Hobbes and Kant.8 The first point of this paper is that 
philosophy and conceptual apparatus is no defence 
against being silent in order to be securely pure and 
uncontaminated by power. 
This paper seeks to outline the variations of what 
Chomsky calls mandarins or priests, how they differ 
within one country and among countries. It questions 
the assumption of non-contamination; and it moves forward to contemplate what 
becomes of normative impulse if, when confronted by horrors, corruption on a 
sliding scale either beckons or becomes inevitable. After all, Chomsky himself, in 
another seminal article, wrote approvingly of the workers’ collectives of Republican 
Catalonia, before their ‘betrayal’ by organised Communism – both the collectives 
and the Communist Government working in the name of revolution. Chomsky 
writes that the Communist effort was in fact counter-revolutionary, and thus 
establishes a further dyadic analysis – the collectives being truly revolutionary. He 
reworks the ground of an unending quarrel over who betrayed whom in Spanish 
Republicanism, but he does problematise the possibilities within an intellectual 
intervention – because, after all, it takes intellect both to support freedom and to 
engineer suppression, especially if great ingenuity is required to suppress freedom 
in the very name of freedom.9 But even the purest Republicans committed their 
own atrocities and staged their own kangaroo courts and unjust executions. In a 
dyadic formulation, siding with one against the other for the sake of a greater and 
more moral truth establishes its own elisions and contradictions. They appear not 
only in the support of rebellion but in working with governments. This paper seeks 
to explore the abnormative abyss that opens whenever one seriously steps outside 
wissenschaft and seeks to engage with the world. This paper proposes that the only 
normative avenue is to embrace a certain abnormativity. Standing purely aloof is 
immoral.
Becoming mandarin
No one becomes mandarin straight-forwardedly. There is no self-abduction from a 
university one day to a government position the next. There are intermediate steps 
that are volitional to be sure – the wanting to have influence, but also the wanting 
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to create change. One joins a civil society group and seeks political allies; one joins 
a political party and becomes identified with a cause, exhibiting expertise and 
knowledge in key areas; something one broadcasts or writes is seen or read by those 
in power and regarded as useful. One sides with a rebel movement, as Edward Said 
did by becoming a member of the Palestine National Council, and is then used as a 
point of transaction between George Schultz in the US Government and the PLO 
– with Said finding himself expressing better impressions of Schultz finally than 
of Arafat.10 What Chomsky seemed to mean was the conscious and self-conscious 
determination to use such avenues for the clear purpose of entering a government 
role. In the Washington DC environment, where half the town seems to be climbing 
the same slippery pole, not all who climb are chosen; those chosen from one party 
are discarded when the other party wins the elections; 
the gains are therefore short-term and are sought with 
great assiduousness despite their temporary nature. 
When the preferred patron-party falls from power, 
the mandarin returns to his or her groves of academe 
and ensures by writing in a certain way that he or she 
is poised for an eventual return. There is no such thing, 
in this formulation, as a redundant mandarin. The self-
consciousness is of the once-and-future-mandarin, 
the priest merely on furlough, where the academy is 
itself the sabbatical from power. 
Immaculate influence in paris
Whereas the US variant of the mandarin must speak as those in power wish 
spoken, the Parisian model is often taken into a minister’s cabinet, or into the 
Elysee, precisely because of a desire to have as a splendidly visible prestige symbol 
a thinker of at least occasional dissidence – around whom the professional career 
officials work, usually without any clear difficulty. But this is to express things one-
dimensionally. What ecological niche did Regis Debray occupy as Mitterand’s 
foreign policy adviser, against his background as a confidante of Che and as a 
habitué of a Bolivian prison which was a result of his association with Che?11 No 
one could say he had not suffered for his engagement with rebellion. No one could 
say he had not exhibited his good faith to good cause. What precise ecological 
niche does the current glamour-boy, Bernard Henri Levy, occupy – with his 
Dior black suits, Charvet shirts, televisual conceits, and quite staunch intellectual 
shallowness?12 Yet, his aura of actual intellect was such that he persuaded Sakozy, 
to whom he had instant access without ever having held an official post, to activate 
his warplanes in defence of Benghazi.13 What of the French archetype of the home 
engage, epitomised by someone like Andre Malraux, who necessarily transits across 
great culture and great engagements, great compromises and great perfidities?14 
There is no Chomskian rendition that encompasses the wild range of such people. 
None occupies a university post, but Chomsky did not mean to say that only 
tenured academics can be corrupted as mandarins. And to the archetypes of this 
sort of French mandarinate, corruption and perfidity are almost marks of personal 
worldliness, of weariness with pure ideals, while being put to the service of what 
are still great causes. The highly intellectual Dominic de Villepin who compellingly 
orated in the Security Council against intervention in Iraq was, nevertheless, the 
same man who helped turn an initial blind eye to genocidal Rwanda. Perhaps a key 
mark of Parisian political perfidity is that the politicians, without ever having been 
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professional thinkers, can be as intellectual as those who claim original residence in 
thinking’s sphere. No one sells out by joining a governmental set because all in these 
sets are inter-changeable anyway.
Bloomsburian new statesmen
Nor do the British exemplars of mandarins fit easily as objects within the Chomskian 
critique. In a way, the origins of the species were such that it was more high-born 
than the political status it might have sought. Bertrand Russell and Maynard Keynes 
were not serfs in the British class system. The high cultural circle of the Bloomsbury 
set provided a foundation for Leonard Woolf and the pacificism associated with his 
wife Virginia, the profound and sincere noblesse oblige of Leonard’s views towards 
Africa (in some ways he was the Geldof of his days) and foreign policy in general15 
– all as part of the deep if not always acknowledged impact he had upon Labour 
Party thinking on the international.16 George Bernard Shaw and the Webbs’ impact 
on Fabianism was precisely an impact directed towards the idea of Labour as a 
commitment to a working class from the vantage point of a high middle class. In a 
pure Trotskyist or Maoist sense it was class-compromised from the very beginning 
and generates a critique considerably more vexed and nuanced than anything 
Chomsky could, in the more egalitarian environment of the US (his criticisms of 
the US notwithstanding), ever devise.
Late modern conundra
The epitome of what Chomsky meant resides in the person and career of Jonathan 
Moyo in Zimbabwe – in and out of favour in President Robert Mugabe’s court 
and, when in favour, its pernicious spokesman and spin doctor, although he would 
probably wish to see himself as a patriotic but fleet-footed arch-Talleyrand figure; 
he would serve anyone for the good, of course, of the country. A former professor 
of politics and author of a groundbreaking study of Zimbabwean democracy,17 
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his abrupt transformation into a high modern mediator of truth, its distorter 
and rebrander, its packager into pop songs and jingles, its vengeful apostle in his 
relentless slander of opponents, see Moyo wishing precisely to be a high priest – 
preferably the highest priest, desirably the Borgia of Zimbabwe who becomes Pope.
Appended to a previously academic figure, such a description would seem at first a 
gross satire. That indicates the preciousness of the academic profession – its sense of 
immunity from corruption – which might have been Chomsky’s actual target. But 
such descriptions are unproblematically applied to journalists who, in the United 
Kingdom, inhabit the ecological niche of Moyo. Alastair Campbell who was the 
first to be described as a ‘spin doctor’ in the inner circle of Tony Blair; Andy Coulson 
(briefly) in the same role for David Cameron – both exemplify the functionary, 
allowed its own glamour and notoriety, provided it spins falsehood into firstly 
plausible truth and, secondly, pleasant truth and, thirdly, historically acceptable 
truth. 
In the US, however, there are academic figures 
who do not spin what becomes history, but seek to 
transform history itself. Chomsky wrote before the 
full apotheosis of Henry Kissinger, the advent of 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Madaleine Albright, Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick, Chester Crocker, and Condoleezza Rice. 
Such figures are unimaginable in the British and 
French systems and were beyond even Chomsky’s 
imagination at his time of writing. But, insofar as they 
departed from any conception of academic objectivity 
and the calling of wissenschaft, their positions in 
government were paralleled by others who also did 
not remain within the parameters of their normal 
boxes. Generals who dissent from the conduct of war, 
if not from actually entering certain wars, and ‘leak’ 
their dissent and secretly brief congressional members; 
members of think tanks normally close to and of great service to US administrations 
who, when confronted by gross deception and perfidity, expose it (as in the famous 
case of Daniel Ellsberg);18 and members of administrations who feed journalists 
the details of subterfuge and deception within the heart of the governments they 
serve (the Deep Throat source for Woodward and Bernstein19) – what their histories 
indicate is that no boxes fit anymore and all professions have become malleable. 
Whether they serve truth or distort it, academics have simply become one more 
profession amongst many that encompass a full range of functions. In this range, it 
is of no moment to accuse some of being the high priests of truth: anyone from any 
profession could be. Similarly, one doesn’t have to be an academic to unleash real 
truth upon the world. 
Track one (and a quarter)
This allows us to enter some trickier terrain beyond mere Chomskian name-calling. 
This terrain involves not a sense of guilt or shame for having intervened in the 
world in the service of a government, but a sense of guilt or shame if one intervenes 
in the world either independently or unofficially, and one fails – and that failure 
has great human consequences. And there is no external body to blame. Being 
uncontaminated and pure, one is blamed for nothing – except perhaps inaction; and 
61
unTruThfuL manDarinS anD manDarinS of TruTh
that inaction can be covered by the profession of uncontaminated critic. And an 
arrest or two does wonders for the CV of the activist truthful professor. 
But, in terms of Chomsky’s own experience, what would have happened to all the 
acts of solidarity if later, e.g. the Sandanistas of Nicaragua had morphed into a 
Stalinist society of self-perpetuation? What happens when, later, all the solidarities 
and support and interventions on behalf of Robert Mugabe’s liberation of Zimbabwe, 
Isaias Afekwerki’s liberation of Eritrea, and Paul Kagame’s liberation of Rwanda, in 
the longer term, only enabled new dictatorships and crushings of dissent? What 
moral weight does the term ‘later’ hold? It is not as if one becomes mandarinesque 
only within the constitutional sureties of a developed and settled society. And what 
if ‘later’ is not applicable because it all happens far too quickly for ‘later’? What 
happens if, even before the battle to oust Gaddafi is 
accomplished, the Transitional National Council in 
Libya, like Saturn, turns to eating its own children – 
when the scholarly solidarist is right in the middle of 
campaigns for recognition and assistance and, indeed 
like the ‘doves’ in the Council, when they are not being 
shot by ‘hawks’, also campaigning for negotiations 
with a wicked but miscomprehended Gadaffi? What 
if active intervention is always one blink of an eyelid 
away from being compromised and sullied? What if, 
in that blink of an eyelid, one enters a Kristevan realm 
of abjection; one sees abominations and inhabits the 
abnormative? Does one not enter such situations, 
content to sit back within a studied purity? These are 
questions that need asking if normative work is to 
have anything other than a Posy Simmonds meaning.
Quarter of a century ago, Track II diplomatic work began to come into its own. 
The 1984 effort on the part of HW van der Merwe and Piet Muller, closely briefed 
by the Nationalist Government in South Africa, to open dialogue with the ANC 
in Lusaka, Zambia, was something both independent of government, unofficial, 
but with a direct feed-in route to government.20 Unofficial diplomacy works best 
if that feed is in place or can readily be put into place when moments are judged 
ripe. The 1991Track II that led to the Oslo process between Israel and the PLO is 
better-known than what happened in Zambia, but again represented an initiative 
spearheaded by unofficial actors who then handed a process already underway to 
official quarters.21 Religious actors have always played a major Track II role and one 
of the most conspicuous and successful was the intervention of the Santo Egidio 
monastery at the end of the 1980s in paving the way to ending the civil war in 
Mozambique.22 Here, there was a crossover between Track II diplomacy and third 
party mediation of conflict. The presumption that private figures can mediate quite 
vicious conflicts has faded over time, except that its latest incarnation is in the form 
of private figures who were once extremely public: Kofi Annan, Jimmy Carter, 
Martti Ahtisaari, and Thabo Mbeki are all creatures who have their telephone calls 
returned. They are successful at Track II because they have assured access and feed 
to Track I at the highest levels. In a very real sense, the distinction between Tracks I 
and II has faded with such actors. That has resulted in a hybrid formation, which I 
call Track I and a quarter. Unenvisaged by the original protagonists of Track II, but 
very much designed to address the debate as to how and when Track II should feed 
into Track I, and to what effect, Track I and a quarter is applied by the Brenthurst 
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Foundation in South Africa, not so much in mediation or for diplomatic missions 
– but to establish diplomatic principles and protocols and, in this way, clear the 
ground for official diplomatic agreement. Teams of about twenty people are brought 
together on each protocol project, with a standard formula of meeting in private 
seminars three times, each in a different global location. Recruited to these teams 
are former Track I actors, just one level below the examples I have named – often 
the very people who, as the background actors to people like Mbeki, actually make 
the agreements work, put the troublesome detail into the broad-brush making 
of peace by their seniors. They are mixed with a worldly brand of academics who 
have extra-academy experience, expertise and reputations but, all the same, deep 
scholarly knowledge; and senior international business people. All the participants 
have greater or lesser access to their home governments. All are brought together 
as an unofficial grouping, but the group is as knowledgeable as any Track I set of 
actors, and can instantly engage Track I in a number of different countries. Of late, 
former Presidents and recently-retired Generals have 
been added to the mix.23
Now, in fact, the formula is not too different to that 
used by several dozen large consultancy firms. The 
objective is to establish something operational. It may 
be normatively operational, desirable according to an 
enunciation of principles that have to do with equity 
and common sense – as opposed to philosophy. The 
difference is that the formula is not used for financial 
profit, and is funded by a charitable foundation. In 
a sense, the formula is a direct extrapolation from 
‘expert groups’ or ‘commissions’ established by the 
UN or other major organisations, but which contain 
independent members drawn from the broad avenues 
of life described above, with a mandate to report 
independent conclusions on a particular enquiry or problem identified by the 
commissioning body. The Brenthurst model circumvents the need for a UN style 
commissioning body and chooses its own themes and reports to a more diverse, 
some would say more difuse community. But the idea of an official body engaging 
the services or participation of ‘unofficials’ is also something that has developed 
latter-day variants. ‘Private military operatives’ (deniably) used by official militaries 
is the tip of an iceberg. But official militaries may also, for instance, embark on 
sudden and extemporaneous war with a country like Libya – being told by their 
political masters that which they are fighting against, but having no idea for whom. 
The scholar with what had been benign contacts with rebel figures in Benghazi – 
before they became rebels – and who knows better than politicians, foreign office 
personnel and military planners the composition and disposition of the rebel 
council becomes suddenly a treasured commodity. How then should or could he 
or she respond? There are at least two variably contestable norms that tear away 
at aloofness and uncontamination: regime change, which became a clear NATO 
objective in the early days of the conflict, would be regarded by most colleagues 
as wrong; allowing columns of tanks to attack a lightly armed city, amidst much 
rhetoric of mercilessness, has its own very clear ethical problems (later disregarded 
by almost all in the attacks on Syrian cities). The siding with rebels, providing voice 
for the rebels in military councils to which they were not invited, and later being 
cast aside when utility was exhausted, is not an unusual position. It should be the 
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usual position of scholars who, without seeking to be mandarins, are exposed to the 
panoply of the world’s wickedness – being not content to comment on wickedness 
from safe mountains in the high distance. 
Tracklessness
And where no path exists? Let me close this problematisation of the simple 
Chomskian formula with a story. It is about a mandarin who left the mandarinate. 
Sent to a chronic war zone in a far away land, he helped bring about (what was 
to be an unsustained) ceasefire between rebel and fragile government forces (it 
was the government that was fragile, not its forces). As he came down from the 
mountains where the war had been fought he passed shelled villages, already poor 
houses with huge shell holes and crumbling walls, and emaciated children begging 
on the roadsides. He felt contaminated and angry and helpless. He resolved to 
leave the mandarinate and become a scholar, so he could reveal the truth of all the 
things he had seen and experienced in this and other heartless conflicts. Perhaps he 
should have thought better. As he progressed down the road towards the capital city, 
devastation still apparent though lessening, but with ragged children still begging 
along the roadside, he saw the brave scholars – not helping, but making notes. 
Perhaps one of them thought to interview the children. In the name of truth.
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